PART I

THE LIFE OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE
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The proposition may appear more definitive than it truly is. Which creatures or sorts of things count as intelligent agents? Insofar as cognitive science seeks to be multidisciplinary, which scientific disciplines are included? Do they interact substantively—share theses, methods, views—or do they simply converse? Finally, how does one discover what cognition is, what it does, and how it works? Cognitive scientists answer these questions in a variety of ways. No answer is without dissent. Each inspires controversy: everyone likes some answer, but no one likes every answer.

Shall we chart the answers? Only a conceptual botanist would delight in that task, besides which, it would be a premature and unhelpfully abstruse way in which to introduce both cognitive science and the content of this Companion. To those two related ends we prefer a short anecdote, then a long story—a very long story. We shall revisit the above characterization at the very end of the story, for by then the abstruse will have metamorphosed into the familiar, and any sources of controversy will be intelligible if not eliminable.

An anecdote: Building 20

Though all three of us objected to the Vietnam War, one of us (GG) was formally classified as a conscientious objector and, during the early 1970s, performed civilian alternative work service for New England Deaconess Hospital in Boston. One day, his day off—on a rather aimless walk through the campus of Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, he came upon some stately wooden buildings set unobtrusively in the middle of the campus. One was marked simply “Building 20.”

Looking for a telephone, the future co-editor asked a student standing in front of the building, “Is there a public phone in 20?” “I don’t know,” replied the student. “All I know about 20 is that Noam Chomsky works here.”
“Noam Chomsky?” One hates to admit such ignorance, but being new to Cambridge and unfamiliar with *Syntactic Structures*, perhaps one can be forgiven.

“What?” Befuddled, but trying to be polite: “Why, he’s the world’s leading linguist.” In retrospect, I had stumbled into the domain of one of the prime movers of modern cognitive science. Chomsky was both icon of the Cambridge anti-war movement and hero of the battle against anti-cognitive psychology – behaviorism.

“Without Chomsky,” added the student, “you would be left with B. F. Skinner and his rats up at Harvard.”

It was the early 1970s. Talk of cognition thinned the air; cognitive science was growing up. So how did cognitive science form? How did it self-conceive and mature? Certainly, Chomsky played a key role. What is the long story.

A predecessor: behaviorism.

In North America something dramatic something often referred to, in retrospect Gardner characterized as “the unofficial p. 7). The revolt was against behaviorist manifesto and quickly came to large influence other disciplines in North America: mentalistic attempts to analyze the mind discovery of regularities involving observer Watson, “as the behaviorist views it is a p. 158). Behaviorism, psychology, and anti-introspectionism. I for its own platform, to legislate psych.

Here, very quickly, most roughly, and psychology should be done.

Step One: Observe behavior.

Step Two: Select descriptions of behavior which are nonmentalistc – that is, which do not presuppose theorizing about the internal psychology of the organism or environment (in which the observed behavior takes place) which themselves are not presupposing about how the organism or agent.

Step Three: Select descriptions of the environment.

Step Four: Note that certain nonmentalistic behaviorist aspects of behavior (such as its frequency of occurrence, physical direction, and so
A compressed example illustrates:

A rat scurries across the alley. It turns left towards a tipped garbage can and ingests food. Remove the rat from the alley. Place it in a laboratory maze. Vary the location of food pellets with the direction of its turning (whether it turns left or right). Note that under certain conditions the behavior of turning left or right is correlated with its immediate history of ingesting food. The history is "responsible" for the direction. Left turning is a function of a food-left history; right turning is a function of a food-right history.

The specification of functionally related stimuli and responses posed a number of problems for behavioristically oriented psychology, itself sometimes called "the experimental analysis of behavior." Often, for example, stimuli and responses selected for a functional class cannot be usefully characterized in an *apsychological* (nonmental) vocabulary. Consider, for example, the temptation to classify the rat’s responses as *seeking* food and *remembering* whether it was found to the left or right. Mentalistic attribution is a tough temptation to resist. In some cases – human verbal behavior, for instance – it is impossible to resist. However, let’s return to the chronology.

In North America behaviorism reigned for decades as a remarkably resilient, influential, and in many ways laudable doctrine that resonated through a number of disciplines beyond psychology. In linguistics it helped to displace philology (the study of the histories of particular languages) with empirical studies of language use. Under the leadership of Leonard Bloomfield, linguistic behaviorism aspired to carry out a program in which linguists would collect speakers’ utterances into a corpus and produce a grammar that described it. Explicitly excluded were any mentalistic assumptions, inferences, or explanations.

In philosophy, the logical positivism of Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel was congenial. Each tried to develop behavioristic canons for the meaningfulness and grounding of scientific hypotheses. Hempel himself eventually abandoned the idea that the behavioral patterns, propensities, or capacities need not only a suitable behavioristic vocabulary, but psychological terms as well (Hempel, 1966, p. 110). Others maintained a thoroughgoing empiricism. Willard van Quine imposed behavioristic standards on the task of interpreting the meaning of a sentence (or oneself) and argued that the only evidence available was the speaker's utterance and the environment. He argued that from this evidence alone the meaning of a sentence would always be indeterminate, and therefore concluded that the notion of meaning was vacuous. He made an exception only for those statements firmly rooted in sensory experience (observation statements).

Not everyone agreed with behaviorist strictures. To such critics as the aforementioned resident of Building 20, behaviorism was a severely truncated, virtually atheoretical...